on the processes of change within the ACFTU, and specifically regarding direct elections. Twenty-three in-depth, qualitative interviews were conducted with relevant key informants in provincial, town and enterprise trade unions. Though not a representative sample for all of China, the interviews in these provinces pioneering direct elections illustrate the constraints and possibilities for organisational change i .
Throughout the paper the term `direct elections' (zhijie xuanju) refers to the process whereby workers nominate any number of candidates to stand for trade union positions such as trade union committee member, vice-chair and chair. This echoes the `sea elections' (haixuan) method pioneered in village elections and was considered by our informants to be the most democratic. Workers then vote directly for their preferred candidates, who should muster more than half of the vote, again reflecting village elections. In practice direct elections embrace a range of practices, from the more democratic sea elections method to more dubious processes, reflecting the contested nature of the concept operates (Cai 2002 , Chan and Zhu 2003 , Chan 2000 , 2001 , Lee 1999 , Pun 2005 , Qiao 2002 , Sheehan 1998 . Faced with a rising number of workers' strikes, protests, demonstrations (Chen 2000 , Howell 1997a , b, 2003 , Lee 2007 , Pan 2002 , Weston 2004 , Thireau and Hua 2003 and workers' self-organising (Xie 2002 , Howell 2004 , and concerned about the threats to social stability, the CCP has urged the ACFTU to play a more prominent role in protecting workers' rights, but always within the the ACFTU has been slow to adapt to the many new challenges it faces in a rapidly growing market economy (Howell 2000) .
Nevertheless it would be wrong to say that the ACFTU has not changed over the past thirty years v , that it has not initiated and contributed to significant reforms in the legislative and regulatory framework governing labour relations in China or that it has not strengthened its institutional position in the administrative hierarchy vi . As these changes have already been well expounded in other texts (Chan 1993 , Howell 1997a , Taylor, Chang and Li 2003 , suffice it here to highlight the key crisis moment democracy movement, the ACFTU came under sharp criticism from the then dominant conservative faction in the Party (Wilson 1990b:61) . Party leaders recognised, however, that a more effective and democratic ACFTU that remained under the leadership of the Party was still preferable to an independent trade union beyond Party control. They astutely conceded more access to the policy-making process, greater influence in the enterprise and greater space to take up workers' grievances in return for accepting Party leadership. As White, Howell and Shang (1996:51-52) note, this was a Faustian bargain `in which the unions linked their fortunes and future to those of the Party'. With the re-ascendancy of Deng and his allies from 1992 onwards, the more progressive wing of the ACFTU emerged out of their post-Tiananmen crevices and began to push again for legislation that would better protect workers. However Party exhortation was still not enough to equip grassroots trade union cadres with the political and ideological tools to handle the conflicting pressures from workers, Party officials and management nor enough to protect them against the threat of job dismissal if they did conscientiously take the side of workers.
Thus the process of organisational change has been slow and halting, often with one step forwards and two steps backwards, and significantly shaped by political and ideological struggles within the Party leadership, institutional and structural factors.
The pressures for greater autonomy have come from radical [an over-statement to call them "radical". "Reformist" is more appropriate] leaders within the ACFTU, sympathetic journalists and labour scholars, and from grassroots trade unionists, who are at the coalface of an increasingly pronounced dualist dilemma. Given the sensitivity of labour issues and the Party's fear of any emerging independent trade union movement akin to Solidarity viii , the ACFTU, when compared to the CYL or ACWF, confronts particularly stringent constraints on internal reform. Three constraints stand out: first, the transmission belt role of the trade union and the classic dualist dilemma this poses; second, the state corporatist nature of the ACFTU; and third, its bureaucratic welfarism. These variables shape at all levels the behaviour and attitudes of trade union cadres to their work and hence the effectiveness of the organisation in defending workers' interests.
In his seminal work on the ACFTU Paul Harper (1969) Given that there is only one officially recognised trade union federation in China, that any attempts to establish alternative trade unions have always been quickly nipped in the bud and that the CCP exerts considerable control over the union, then the ACFTU can aptly be described as a corporatist institution. Moreover, because of the classic dualism noted above, the ACFTU is better described as a state corporatist institution rather than a societal corporatist institution x which gives precedence to the representation of worker interests', autonomous and voluntary organisation.
Labelling the ACFTU as state corporatist is, however, static. It reveals little about how an institution can move from a state to societal corporatist model or indeed to a pluralist, civil-society type model where numerous, voluntarily formed trade unions vie for influence over government. Indeed Schmitter (1979:126-7 ) is pessimistic about the possibility of any peaceful and incremental transformation from a state corporatist to societal corporatist regime. Pravda and Ruble (1976) interests rather than bureaucratic orders and towards addressing workers' grievances in the workplace rather than just administering welfare, the elections would provide a mechanism for undermining bureaucratic welfarism. In the next section we examine more closely the rationale behind direct elections as expressed by reformist trade union leaders. The third issue in the armoury of opponents and more cautious reformers revolves around political stability. Here the argument runs that direct elections will produce weak, incompetent or politically risky leaders, who will be unable or unwilling to moderate workers' demands and, most importantly, will be beyond Party control. Or, it is argued, workers will tend to elect leaders who belong to the same clan or nativeplace, which will only fuel clan and place-based tensions within factories and undermine the cohesion of the trade union.
Given that the more radical reformers have not been able to institutionalise the The situation in the printing factory, ownership? which started elections in 1996, , Same questions for the first factory apply to this one. differs in that the three candidates for trade union chair were all managers, rather than workers, and nominated by the enterprise management rather than by the workers. All three were required to make speeches and drew lots to decide who would speak first. The trade union members cast their votes in public using voting slips, leaving room for others to Interviews with trade union leaders in enterprises that are noted by the local trade unions to be models for direct elections suggest that elected trade union leaders soon learn to prioritise production over workers' interests. For example, in a discussion with a trade union chair and vice-chair in a foreign-invested clothing factory [Is this one of the factories described above?] , it was striking that they did not consider their role in persuading workers to work excessive overtime as problematic xliv . Similarly their focus on welfare issues, such as the quality of food, dormitory conditions and entertainment rather than on hours of work or wages suggest the ongoing reproduction of the trade union as usual. In a printing factory in town H [which printing factory?
One of those described above?] , the trade union chair explained how they organised activities for workers during the slack season so that they would not seek employment elsewhere, thus again facilitating production goals. Similarly the elected chair of the clothing factory in town H explained the role of the union in cultivating loyalty and identity amongst migrant workers. In his words ` of course, the future trade union needs to change the attitude of workers, …that is, change a worker from someone who is outside of society to someone who is an enterprise person, for example, love their job, love their factory…' xlv . This is further complicated by the third institutional factor, namely, the anomaly in trade union membership conditions, whereby from the 1950s onwards any salaried, permanent staff in the enterprise, be they manual or mental workers, could become trade union members (Lee 1986: 48, 115) xlvi . This has led to the paradoxical situation in which managers stand for election and become elected as trade union chairs, as described in the printing factory earlier. For example, in a factory in province B the existing directly elected trade union chair was a relative of the factory owner. The owner agreed to have sea elections for the chair position and the workers elected the existing trade union chair. As she was also a salaried staff member of the factory, the higher-level trade union could not object to her nomination. Furthermore as this was an export company with above average salary levels and working conditions, the union was loathe to intervene. Its response was to note this but not use this factory as a model for emulation. Similarly, in one enterprise in town K in province B the general manager won the election for trade union chair. The trade union initially cancelled these results. However, the higher level trade union overruled this, arguing that the person with the most votes, whether worker or manager, should win (Nanfangdu Shibao, 2003) . Interviews with other trade union cadres also revealed similar anomalies, which reflect the lack of class analysis within the ACFTU and the unwillingness of trade union cadres to confront both more powerful higher levels in the union and factory owners.
Finally the progress of the direct elections has been hamstrung by the structural relations between the Party, ACFTU and business at the local level. Party leaders, trade union leaders and enterprise owners have colluded to ensure that local development is prioritised over workers' interests. Local governments are keen to attract foreign investors, offering numerous policy concessions and the promise of a cheap, compliant workforce. If the local trade union were to prioritise too much the interests of workers, it would be simultaneously failing in its tasks of promoting production, economic growth and ultimately Party interests. As the head of the Grassroots Work Section of province B trade union pointed out:
"You can't focus only on workers…it doesn't benefit the enterprise as whole.
If you mobilise the workers against the boss, then the enterprise may go bankrupt.
You should promote the interests of capital and you can protect the basic interests of The path of the trade union direct elections has thus taken a very different course to village elections, which have been institutionalised and generalised across the country.
On the one hand this reflects the lack of a coherent and cohesive group of visionary reformers at different levels with strong links to sympathetic Party leaders and their failure to make the case persuasively; on the other hand it underlines the much greater sensitivity pertaining to labour issues and trade union reform which puts the Party doubly on its guard. Any significant move forwards with direct elections is only likely to happen when there is a shift in the political context, either because of regime crisis or because of political liberalisation. In the meantime it is likely that conservative union officials, who heed more the interests of the Party and factory owners than workers, will continue to resist the implementation of elections or manipulate them so as to ensure the election of safe candidates. So plus ca change, plus c'est la meme.
With any fundamental trade union reform still in the distant future, we can expect workers to increasingly find their own ways to organise and resist workplace exploitation. iii Clearly the simplistic model of Western trade unions as independent, adversarial and evolving out of grassroots activism cannot do justice to the gamut of trade union forms that exist. For a detailed discussion of differences between communist and capitalist trade unionism see Littler and Palmer (1986:253-271) . iv As Lee (1986: 159) comments, `Chinese unions have little of no "sub-system autonomy". Chinese union leaders make no pretense about this…Chinese unions are essentially an arm of the executive to mobilise the resources of society". v Some of these changes include re-structuring the organisation, re-skilling trade union leaders to engage in collective bargaining, negotiate contracts, provide legal advice and mediate disputes, and participating in legislative processes. vi By the mid-1980s, for example, the State Council had issued an order permitting trade unions to participate in meetings of all administrative organs wherever workers' interests were touched upon (Chan 1993:53) . vii For further details of the three crises in the ACFTU's pre-reform history see Harper 1969 and White, Howell and Shang 1996: 41-42. viii For a detailed analysis of the Party's response to events in Poland during the 1980s and the implications of these for trade union and labour policies see Wilson (1990a, b) . ix Pravda and Ruble (1986: 3) describe classic dualism in terms of two distinct functions: the union's role in mobilising production and the union's role of protecting members' rights and interests.
x Schmitter (1979: 105) distinguishes state from societal corporatism. He associates societal corporatism with post-liberal, advanced capitalist, democratic welfare states and state corporatism with political systems that are anti-liberal and authoritarian, where elections are non-existent, only one party prevails, with an exclusive ideology. xi Ni Zhifu commented: "Our trade union is more like a "government-run organisation", which has seldom played an independent role in organising activities…, since it has long been affected and fettered by the party's "centralised leadership", an administrative structure characterised by overcentralisation of power, and undue emphasis on keeping trade union operations in line with social interests" (quoted in Wilson, 1990b: 55) . xii In the early 1950s the ACFTU did have to mobilise workers into unions, the priority being to control workers for reinvigorating production rather than defending their rights (Lee 1986:41-44) 
